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Since the beginning of the credit crisis, spreads  • 
on corporate bonds (the difference between the 
yields on a corporate bond and a government 
bond with identical cash ﬂ  ows) worldwide have 
widened markedly. 
This article decomposes Canadian corporate  • 
spreads into default and liquidity components 
for selected Canadian ﬁ  rms, using a model that 
extracts default information from credit default 
swaps.
During the credit crisis in 2008, the liquidity  • 
component for speculative-grade bonds in-
creased earlier than it did for investment-grade 
bonds, which is consistent with a “ﬂ  ight-to-qual-
ity” scenario.
Although the results are based on a small sample  • 
of Canadian ﬁ  rms, they are consistent with recent 
research on how liquidity risk is priced in corpor-
ate bond markets. 
S
ince the beginning of the credit crisis in mid-
2007, corporate spreads worldwide widened 
markedly. In Canada, the aggregate spread 
for investment-grade ﬁ  rms reached a maximum of 
401 basis points (bps) in January and March of 2009, 
substantially more than the historical average of 
92 bps; the spread on the equivalent index in the 
United States reached 656 bps in December 2008, 
also substantially more than its historical average of 
153 bps (Chart 1).
1 Owing to the problems in funding 
markets, corporations and ﬁ  nancial institutions began 
to replace “risky” assets with “safer” ones; this “ﬂ  ight-
to-quality” effect resulted in large price declines in 
equity and corporate bond markets and increases in 
prices in the government market. 
In this article, the corporate bond spread is deﬁ  ned as 
the difference between the yields on a corporate bond 
and a government bond with identical cash ﬂ  ows. 
Under this deﬁ  nition, the corporate spread reﬂ  ects the 
additional compensation required by investors to hold 
the corporate bond compared with the return on the 
default-free asset (the government bond). This addi-
tional yield compensates investors for two types of 
risk: (i) the risk of default, i.e., that the ﬁ  rm may not 
be able to meet the promised cash ﬂ  ows; and (ii) the 
liquidity risk, i.e., the risk that the investor may not 
be able to sell the bond quickly, before it matures, 
without a signiﬁ  cant discount to the existing market 
price. 
Since promoting ﬁ  nancial stability is part of the 
mandate of central banks, they have a natural interest 
in understanding what drives changes in corporate 
spreads—default risk, liquidity risk, or both—since 
1  The average spreads for Canada and the United States are calculated 
for the period from 31 December 1996 to 18 May 2009, using the 
Merrill Lynch corporate indexes for investment-grade ﬁ  rms. The new 
maximum spreads surpassed previous record highs for this period of 
272 bps on 10 October 2002 for the United States and 143 bps on 
24 October 2002 for Canada. 
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risk. Corporate spreads seem to be too high for 
default risk to be the only contributing factor; in 
addition, they are inconsistent with historical default 
rates and recoveries (Elton et al. 2001). Observed 
corporate spreads are also inconsistent with trad-
itional structural models based on Merton (1974) 
(Huang and Huang 2003). As well, changes in 
spreads on corporate bonds are not well explained 
by changes in the factors affecting default risk 
(Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin 2001), and 
the unexplained portion appears to have a common 
factor. Liquidity risk may therefore be an important 
factor affecting corporate spreads, since corporate 
bond markets are much less liquid than government 
bond markets. Various approaches are used in the 
literature to measure the two components of corpor-
ate bond spreads. These approaches are detailed next.
Liquidity component
Researchers have used different methods to measure 
the liquidity of corporate bonds and to study the 
relationship between liquidity, liquidity risk, and 
corporate spreads. Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) 
use implicit bid-ask spreads and the frequency of 
zero returns to measure the liquidity of corporate 
bonds. Chacko (2005) and Mahanti et al. (2008) use 
the turnover of portfolios holding the bond, and others 
(Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar 2007; Goldstein, 
Hotchkiss, and Sirri 2007; Bao, Pan, and Wang 2008) 
use measures of the impact on prices. In general, they 
ﬁ  nd a positive relationship between the illiquidity of 
corporate bonds and their yield spreads. Several 
recent studies (de Jong and Driessen 2006; Downing, 
Underwood, and Xing 2007; Acharya, Amihud, and 
Bharath 2008) analyze how liquidity risk is priced in 
corporate bond returns. They ﬁ  nd that, relative to 
investment-grade bonds, speculative-grade bonds 
carry a higher liquidity-risk premium. Most of these 
papers estimate models focusing on one aspect of 
illiquidity, such as transactions costs, inventory risk, 
asymmetric information, or search costs. In addition, 
most papers relate their illiquidity measures to corpor-
ate spreads in regressions, and are therefore not 
suitable to decompose corporate bonds into liquidity 
and default components.
Default component
In general, researchers use two methods to estimate 
the default risk of corporate spreads. One way is to 
use historical default rates and recoveries; this 
method ignores the risk premium associated with 
their policy response will be different, depending on 
which factor is responsible. If, for example, rising 
corporate spreads result mainly from an increase in 
liquidity risk, and the central bank judges that this 
warrants intervention, then it might address the 
situation, at least in part, by providing liquidity. In 
contrast, if rising spreads are the result of increased 
default risk, the appropriate policy response may be 
quite different.
2 Decomposing corporate spreads is 
not easy, because both components are unobserv-
able and possibly correlated. 
This article is part of a series of papers that studies 
the risks—mainly default and liquidity—that are priced 
into corporate bond spreads.
3 Its contributions to this 
research agenda are as follows: (i) the use of informa-
tion from the credit default swap and bond markets 
for Canadian ﬁ  rms; (ii) analysis that is performed at 
the ﬁ  rm level; and (iii) a focus on Canadian ﬁ  rms that 
access funding in the United States.
4
Related Literature
For some time, researchers have been investigating 
how much of the corporate bond spread is attribut-
2  One reason why the policy reaction may be different for liquidity 
risk than for default risk is that the former may be the result of a 
“friction” (i.e., information), whereas the latter may be the result of 
systematic factors. 
3  Garcia and Gravelle (2008) use a structural model with equity data to 
decompose Canadian corporate spreads.
4  Other work decomposing spreads for Canada focuses on the 
aggregate index spread, using equity-based structural models 
instead of prices on credit default swaps (see Garcia and Gravelle 
2008).
Chart 1:  Corporate bond spreads in Canada and the 
United States
Note: Merrill Lynch spreads for broad corporate indexes. Corporate yield spreads are 
adjusted only for embedded options. Sample: 31 December 1996 to 18 May 2009.
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default losses only in the case of a default.
Figure 1 shows the cash ﬂ  ows for a typical CDS 
when no default occurs, while Figure 2 shows cash 
ﬂ  ows in a default scenario. The orange boxes repre-
sent the annuity payments made by the protection 
buyer, while the black box in Figure 2 represents the 
payment that the protection seller makes to the 
protection buyer upon default.
As in any swap, the premium (which determines the 
annuity payments) is the rate that equates the expected 
streams of cash ﬂ  ows that the buyer and the seller 
make. The CDS premium therefore contains informa-
tion on the default probability associated with a 
reference entity, since this information is embedded in 
the expected payment made by the protection seller.
CDS contracts are commonly used to extract proxies 
for default risk for several reasons. As contracts, not 
securities, CDSs are far less sensitive to liquidity 
default risk. Thus, in these models, no consideration 
is given to the extra premium that investors require to 
invest in risky securities whose returns are correlated 
with systematic factors. Another method is to deter-
mine default risk relative to other traded ﬁ  nancial 
instruments, such as equity and credit derivatives. 
According to Merton (1974), equity can be treated as a 
call option on ﬁ  rm values. Corporate bonds can be 
treated as a portfolio holding an equivalent risk-free 
government bond and shorting a put option. Equity 
prices can be used to extract information about the 
ﬁ  rm’s valuation process, which can then be used to 
price corporate bonds. The validity of this method 
requires that the structural models be correctly 
speciﬁ  ed. Huang and Huang (2003) show, however, 
that since most structural models are misspeciﬁ  ed, 
their results cast doubts on the value of using struc-
tural models to decompose corporate spreads. 
With the growth of markets for credit derivatives in 
recent years, researchers have started to use credit 
derivatives, such as credit default swaps, to estimate 
the default component of corporate spreads (Longstaff, 
Mithal, and Neis 2005). We use credit default swaps 
to decompose the spreads on Canadian corporate 
bonds because, as discussed in the next section, 
their lower susceptibility to liquidity effects makes 
them a much purer measure of default risk. In addi-
tion, the reduced-form approach we use to evaluate 
credit default swaps is less prone to misspeciﬁ  cation.
Credit Default Swaps 
A credit default swap (CDS) is a contract that provides 
insurance against the default of a particular company. 
The company is known as the reference entity, and a 
speciﬁ  c bond of the company is known as the refer-
ence obligation. The quantity of the reference obliga-
tion to which the derivative contract applies is known 
as the notional principal.
5 In a CDS, there are two 
parties to the contract: the buyer of credit protection 
makes periodic payments to the seller of the credit 
protection until either the contract matures or there is 
a default event by the company. In exchange for the 
periodic payments made by the buyer, the seller 
agrees to pay the buyer the difference between the 
face value and the market value of the reference 
obligation if a credit event occurs. If no default occurs, 
the protection buyer still makes all the agreed-upon 
5  The total outstanding notional principal of CDS contracts for a given 
reference entity can exceed the total amount outstanding of the 
reference obligation.
Figure 1:  Credit default swap: Cash ﬂ  ows when there 
is no default
Note: The orange boxes represent the payments made by the protection buyer to 
the protection seller.
Source: Bank of Canada 
Protection buyer’s annuity payments
Time
Maturity
Figure 2:  Credit default swap: Cash ﬂ  ows when 
default occurs
Note: The orange boxes represent the payments made by the protection buyer to the 
protection seller. The black box represents the payment made by the protection seller to the 
protection buyer at default.
Source: Bank of Canada
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Maturity Default
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controls that helped to focus on the most liquid CDS 
contracts in our sample.
8
Data
In practice, the CDS quote can be different from the 
CDS transaction price. The CDS quote reﬂ  ects the 
risk characteristics of the reference entity, whereas 
the transaction price can also reﬂ  ect the differential in 
counterparty risk between the protection buyer and 
the seller. For this article, we use quote data obtained 
from Markit Inc., the leading provider of CDS data. 
We obtained a dataset of Canadian ﬁ  rms for which 
there are CDS contracts and bonds with a maturity 
greater than one year. Because of the aforementioned 
data limitations on Canadian-dollar-denominated 
CDSs, we use U.S.-dollar-denominated securities 
(CDSs and bonds). We also need data for the yields on 
U.S. risk-free zero-coupon bonds, which are obtained 
from the study by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006). 
Our initial dataset included 38 Canadian ﬁ  rms. Filtering 
out Canadian Crown corporations, ﬁ  rms with too few 
CDS or corporate bond quotes, ﬁ  rms without senior 
unsecured debt, and ﬁ  rms for which the number of 
common dates between the CDS data and the corres-
ponding bonds are less than a year, we are left with a 
set of eight large Canadian ﬁ  rms from various sectors 
of the economy. Six of the ﬁ  rms are rated BBB, while 
the other two are rated CC (see Table 1 for selected 
statistics on the ﬁ  rms’ bond data). The bond and CDS 
data used in the article cover different samples for 
each ﬁ  rm, beginning as early as June 2006 and ending 
as late as November 2008.
9
For the Canadian ﬁ  rms selected, we prepared the 
data by selecting bonds and CDS prices that had two 
or more quotes per week and interpolating them 
linearly, when necessary, to obtain a common day of 
the week used to change the frequency of the data 
from daily to weekly. We did this to obtain a dataset 
where, at each moment in time, there is an observa-
tion for the CDS and the bond prices, which allows 
8  Note that default risk on Canadian-dollar and U.S.-dollar bonds 
issued by the same Canadian entity may differ, to the extent that 
they could be subject to different rules governing default or debt 
workouts in different jurisdictions.
9  The sample data available for the eight ﬁ  rms used here are for the 
following periods: Firm 1, 30 June 2006–14 November 2008; Firm 2, 
23 June 2006–31 October 2008; Firm 3, 8 June 2007–24 October 
2008; Firm 4, 22 June 2007–31 October 2008; Firm 5, 14 July 
2006–7 November 2008; Firm 6, 30 June 2006–7 November 2008; 
Firm 7, 10 November 2006–14 November 2008; and Firm 8, 30 June 
2006–31 October 2008.
effects, since securities are in ﬁ  xed supply, while the 
supply of CDSs can be arbitrarily large. Because of 
this reduced sensitivity, CDSs provide a better measure 
of default risk. As well, it is less costly for investors to 
liquidate CDSs prior to maturity than to liquidate a 
corporate bond, since investors simply enter into a 
swap contract in the opposite direction. Further, CDSs 
are not likely to become “special” like treasury bills, 
or “squeezed” like corporate bonds.
6 In principle, 
therefore, CDSs should contain mainly default infor-
mation about the reference entity. However, they are 
not totally immune to liquidity effects, since search 
costs may be high for illiquid CDS contracts.
7
In principle, CDSs should 
contain mainly default information 
about the reference entity. 
However, they are not totally 
immune to liquidity effects.
It is difﬁ  cult to obtain data from the Canadian-dollar 
CDS market for Canadian reference entities, since this 
market is underdeveloped and illiquid compared with 
the U.S. market. Moreover, because of the illiquidity 
of the market, these data are likely to contain a non-
negligible liquidity component, which violates our 
basic modelling assumption. An alternative is to use 
data from CDSs issued in U.S. dollars for Canadian 
entities. Although better than data from the Canadian-
dollar CDS market, these data are available for a 
limited number of ﬁ  rms, only some of which may have 
liquid contracts. A caveat persists as well with respect 
to the degree of liquidity risk embedded in CDS 
prices—anecdotal evidence suggests that, during a 
crisis, CDS prices, like corporate bonds, might carry 
a liquidity-risk premium. In this study, we use the most 
liquid CDS contracts to decompose Canadian corpor-
ate spreads and make every effort to minimize any 
decomposition bias resulting from potential illiquidity 
in CDS contracts. In the next section, we present the 
6  “Specials” are speciﬁ  c repo rates signiﬁ  cantly below prevailing 
market interest rates for loans of similar maturity and credit risk. 
“Squeezed” refers to a shortage of supply relative to demand for a 
particular security, as evidenced by a movement in its price (or its 
repo rate) to a level that is not in line with the prices of comparable 
securities.
7  Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) use the most liquid CDS contracts 
in their study.
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default risk, whereas the CDS includes compensation 
only for default risk.
10 
The methodology can be summarized as follows. We 
have two unobserved variables, liquidity and default, 
as well as time series for the CDSs and several bond 
prices for the same reference entity. From the CDSs, 
we obtain the default factor, which is used to obtain 
the liquidity factor from the bond prices. We are able 
to determine both factors by estimating the param-
eters of the model to minimize pricing errors.
11 We 
proceed to create a synthetic zero-coupon 5-year 
bond. For the synthetic bond, we ﬁ  nd the correspond-
ing yield to maturity and subtract the risk-free rate to 
obtain the corporate spread. The corporate spread 
thus obtained is then decomposed into its default 
component, such that the yield to maturity includes 
only the risk-free rate and the default compensation, 
and its liquidity component (the difference between 
the corporate spread and the default component).
Results
We ﬁ  rst analyze the results around three key events: 
(i) the Bear Stearns liquidation of two hedge funds 
that invested in various types of mortgage-backed 
securities on 31 July 2007; (ii) the announcement by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York that it would 
provide term ﬁ  nancing to facilitate the acquisition by 
JPMorgan Chase of The Bear Stearns Companies on 
24 March 2008; and (iii) Lehman Brothers ﬁ  ling for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on 15 September 
2008.
12 Chart 2 shows the decomposition for the 
average ﬁ  rm from the investment-grade category, and 
Chart 3 shows the results for the average ﬁ  rm from the 
speculative-grade category.
The liquidity component of both investment- and 
speculative-grade ﬁ  rms started to increase right after 
the liquidation of the Bear Stearns hedge funds, 
consistent with the overall market conditions. After the 
acquisition of Bear Stearns, the investment-grade 
ﬁ  rms’ liquidity and default component decreased 
slightly, and the speculative-grade ﬁ  rms’ components 
also decreased for a short period. Both of these 
effects possibly reﬂ  ect the awareness of government 
support for troubled ﬁ  rms. After the ﬁ  ling by Lehman, 
10  This assumes that the CDS liquidity compensation is negligible.
11 See  the  Box on p. 28 and Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) for 
details on the model and the estimation.
12  Another key event was the halt on redemptions on three investment 
funds on 9 August 2007 by BNP Paribas, France’s largest bank. This, 
with the Bear Stearns acquisition, triggered subsequent events that 
led to the ﬁ  nancial crisis. 
the model to extract information simultaneously from 
all prices and thus to decompose the spread.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for each CDS 
contract. The CDS premiums show that the eight 
ﬁ  rms in our sample can be separated into two groups:   
sub-investment (or speculative-) grade ﬁ  rms, which 
includes Firms 1 and 2; and investment-grade ﬁ  rms. 
Firms in the ﬁ  rst group have higher and more volatile 
CDS premiums, while those in the second group have 
lower and more stable premiums.
Methodology
We use a reduced-form model based on the frame-
work of Jarrow and Turnbull (1995); Lando (1998); and 
Dufﬁ  e and Singleton (1999). In this model, investors 
demand a return for holding corporate bonds that 
includes the risk-free rate, the default risk of the 
issuer, and the liquidity premium associated with the 
security. Similarly, investors demand compensation 
for selling the CDS that includes the risk-free rate and 
the default risk associated with the reference entity 
(bond issuer). Note that, in the model, we assume that 
Table 2: Contract data for credit default swaps




Firm 1 1,665 1,612 6,984 Speculative
Firm 2 1,082 967 5,995 Speculative
Firm 3 87 64 405 Investment
Firm 4 350 90 538 Investment
Firm 5 108 50 213 Investment
Firm 6 141 57 306 Investment
Firm 7 75 66 337 Investment
Firm 8 71 69 403 Investment
Note: All CDS contracts have a 5-year maturity.
Source: Bank of Canada
Table 1: Firms’ bond data
Rating BBB CC
Number of ﬁ  rms 62
Minimum number of bonds 23
Maximum number of bonds 34
Note:  Data from Markit Inc. cover the period June 2006 to November 2008. The BBB 
rating includes all ranges within the BBB category. CC-rated ﬁ  rms were downgraded 
to D in April 2009.
Source: Markit Inc.
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Estimating the Model
Let   denote the risk-free rate,   the intensity of the 
Poisson process governing default,   a liquidity 
premium, and c the continuous coupon rate paid by 
the corporate bond. Each of the processes  ,  , 
and   is stochastic. Following Lando (1998), we 
assume that a bondholder recovers a fraction 1 – w  
(ﬁ  xed at 50 per cent) of the par value of the bond 
in the event of default. Then a corporate bond that 
pays a continuous coupon rate c is priced as 
follows:
 (1)
where T is the time to maturity. Let s denote the 
continuous premium paid by the CDS buyer. The 
present value of the premium leg of a credit default 
swap (Pre) can be expressed as,
 (2)
The value of the protection leg of a CDS (Pro) can 
be expressed as: 
 (3)
From equating both payment legs, we obtain the 
expression for the CDS premium as:
 (4)
To obtain closed-form evaluations for both corpor-
ate bonds and CDSs, we specify the risk-neutral 
dynamics for default-intensity process   and 
liquidity process   as follows:
 (5)
The closed-form formula for both corporate bonds 
and CDS premiums can be found in Longstaff, 
Mithal, and Neis (2005). To estimate the model, we 
minimize the pricing error for the CDS premiums 
and the bond prices associated with a given ﬁ  rm. 
We recover   from time-series observations of 
CDS premiums;
1 then, at each time t, we recover   
by minimizing the percentage pricing errors from 
at least two corporate bonds at time t. We ﬁ  nd 
maximum-likelihood estimates for those param-
eters by minimizing the sum of corporate bond 
pricing errors over the entire sample. 
1  The initial values used for the parameters are reasonable 
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+ − =at all—in the market. Right after the ﬁ  ling by Lehman, 
however, we notice that, for both types of ﬁ  rm, it is the 
increase in the liquidity component that dominates the 
change in the spread. This is in line with the drastic 
deterioration in North American credit markets.
In more general terms, our results show that, for 
investment-grade ﬁ  rms, the majority of the spread 
corresponds to liquidity; on average, the liquidity 
component accounts for 63 per cent of the spread. 
For speculative-grade ﬁ  rms, it is the reverse—the 
majority of the spread corresponds to default, with the 
default component accounting for 77 per cent of the 
spread, on average.
13 In addition, our results provide 
evidence that the liquidity component increased 
earlier for the speculative-grade ﬁ  rms. 
For investment-grade ﬁ  rms, the 
majority of the spread corresponds 
to liquidity. For speculative-grade 
ﬁ  rms, the majority of the spread 
corresponds to default.
These results are consistent with those of de Jong 
and Driessen (2006) and Acharya, Amihud, and 
Bharath (2008) in ﬁ  nding that the credit crisis has had 
a larger impact on speculative-grade than on invest-
ment-grade bonds. As shown in Charts 2 and 3, the 
overall spread is much higher and the liquidity com-
ponent (red line) increased markedly and earlier for 
speculative-grade ﬁ  rms.
14 For the average invest-
ment-grade ﬁ  rm, the increase in the liquidity compon-
ent was less drastic than the corresponding increase 
for the average speculative-grade ﬁ  rm, at least prior 
to the Lehman ﬁ  ling, after which it dominates the 
change in the spread. At this point, however, the CDS 
data are a less-reliable source of default risk.
Similarly, a comparison of the volatility of the liquidity 
component across ﬁ  rms shows that spreads for 
(speculative-grade) ﬁ  rms 1 and 2 exhibited larger 
volatilities in their liquidity component than did 
(investment-grade) ﬁ  rms 3 to 8 (Table 3). Although 
ﬁ  rm 7 has a mean liquidity component higher than 
that of ﬁ  rm 2, the associated standard deviation is 
much smaller.
13  For speculative-grade bonds, the liquidity premium is a smaller share 
of a wider spread, and thus is larger in absolute terms.
14  Note that the vertical axis in Chart 3 is more than three times larger 
than the one in Chart 2.
the default component of the average investment- and 
speculative-grade ﬁ  rm started to increase, while the 
liquidity component for both increased substantially. 
It is difﬁ  cult to determine the medium-term impact of 
the ﬁ  ling by Lehman, since there are only a limited 
number of days for which the CDS data for Canadian 
ﬁ  rms are still reliable. After September 2008, the CDS 
data quickly become unreliable as a pure source of 
default risk, owing to reduced trading—or no trading 
Chart 3:  Corporate bond spreads for an average 
speculative-grade ﬁ  rm
Synthetic zero-coupon 5-year bond
Note: The green lines represent the dates when Bearn Stearns liquidated two hedge funds 
that had invested in mortgage-backed securities (31 July 2007), the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York announced that it would provide term ﬁ  nancing to facilitate JPMorgan Chase’s 
acquisition of Bear Stearns (24 March 2008), and Lehman Brothers ﬁ  led for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy (15 September 2008).
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Chart 2:  Corporate bond spreads for an average 
investment-grade ﬁ  rm
Synthetic zero-coupon 5-year bond
Note: The green lines represent the dates when Bear Stearns liquidated two hedge funds 
that had invested in mortgage-backed securities (31 July 2007), the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York announced that it would provide term ﬁ  nancing to facilitate JPMorgan Chase’s 
acquisition of Bear Stearns (24 March 2008), and Lehman Brothers ﬁ  led for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy (15 September 2008).
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the crisis; and (iii) the liquidity component increased 
more for speculative-grade bonds during the credit 
crisis, which is typical of a “ﬂ  ight-to-quality” phenom-
enon. While these ﬁ  ndings are consistent with intui-
tion, they should be veriﬁ  ed with a larger sample of 
ﬁ  rms once more data become available as the market 
for CDSs for Canadian ﬁ  rms develops further. 
The proportion of liquidity and 
default risk varies across ﬁ  rms and 
over time, and the nature of the 
variation depends on the nature 
of the shock to the economy.
A key implication of these results is that, in designing 
policies to address problems in credit markets, it is 
important to consider that the liquidity component in 
corporate spreads for investment- and speculative-
grade bonds behaves differently than the default 
risk, especially during crisis episodes.
Future work on the decomposition of corporate bond 
spreads should focus on: (i) the study of Canadian-
dollar-denominated corporate bond markets, (ii) com-
paring different methods of decomposing Canadian 
corporate spreads, and (iii) incorporating time-varying 
default- and liquidity-risk premiums in the analysis. In 
addition, appropriate policy responses under different 
conditions should be investigated.




Firm 1 4.13 5.74 Speculative
Firm 2 2.14 3.85 Speculative
Firm 3 1.58 0.37 Investment
Firm 4 1.57 1.04 Investment
Firm 5 1.39 0.74 Investment
Firm 6 1.98 1.12 Investment
Firm 7 3.00 0.63 Investment
Firm 8 0.93 0.98 Investment
Note: The level of the liquidity component is obtained from the total spread minus the 
spread with only default taken into account.
Source: Bank of Canada
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